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Abstract 
The new knowledge-based economy is also 
known as “the information economy,” “the second 
industrial revolution” or “the post-industrial society.”  
It finally arrived in the twenty-first century after being 
heralded for a long time.  The new economy focuses 
on talent, knowledge, and information.  It is based on 
mobile services, such as email, the internet, and 
intranets, which make new dot com companies more 
competitive in this new economy.  This economy is 
global, and it will steadily increase the globalization 
of businesses.  The basic issue concerning corporate 
governance in the new economy is whether corporate 
directors should view themselves solely as the 
stewards of their investors’ capital, and so aim to 
maximize shareholder value, or whether they should 
view themselves as the custodians of their companies’ 
human capital, and thus concentrate more on 
protecting the interests and developing the knowledge 
and skills of their employees.  In the new economy, 
people play an increasingly significant role in 
corporate governance in the midst of the 
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transformation from an industrialized to an 
information-oriented society.  This article discusses 
the importance of employees in terms of their role as 
one of the primary stakeholders in a company, in 
order to consider why human capital has become 
centralized, and the nature and scope of legal rules 
and mechanisms that should be adopted regarding 
human capital, using the legislative experiences of the 
UK and China as two case studies. 
Keywords: new economy, stakeholder theory, human 
capital, employees, company law 
It is not the strongest of the species that survive, 
nor the most intelligent, but the ones most 
responsive to change. 
– Charles Darwin 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite conflicting views about their impacts, increasing 
globalization and the development of information technology over 
the last two decades are changing every single aspect of the way we 
work, and particularly the ways in which economies develop. 1  
Compared to conventional methods of production, production in the 
modern economy is more likely to be in an intangible form, based on 
the exploitation of ideas rather than material things.  This is the so-
called weightless economy, which is seen as a significant change in 
light of the new technology and the knowledge explosion that has 
taken place since the 1990s.  In addition, technological development 
has brought about a higher sustained level of productivity growth, 
allowing faster economic growth with lower inflation.2  Therefore, 
many academics and practitioners use the term “new economy” to 
 
1 Catherine L. Fisk, Knowledge Work: New Metaphors for the New Economy, 80 
CHI. KENT. L. REV. 839, 839–40 (2005); HM TREASURY, A STRONG AND 
STRENGTHENING ECONOMY: INVESTING IN BRITAIN’S FUTURE, ECONOMIC AND 
FISCAL STRATEGY REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENT AND BUDGET REPORT, HC 
968, at 2 (2006). 
2 Robert L. Formaini & Thomas F. Siems, New Economy Myths and Reality, 3 FED. 
RES. BANK DALL. S. W. ECON. 4 (May/June, 2003). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss3/2
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describe the economy of the world from the 1990s onwards, 
especially with reference to developed countries. 3 
With society becoming progressively more knowledge-based 
and information-based, employees are increasingly being considered 
as assets of a company and one of the company’s biggest overheads.4  
In knowledge-based industries, employees, as providers of human 
capital, have become the key to business success, since such 
companies are heavily dependent on their employees’ knowledge, 
expertise and active involvement in order to outperform other 
companies. 
From a European perspective, the importance of placing 
human capital investment at the forefront of policies to promote 
economic growth and social cohesion was explicitly outlined in the 
Lisbon Summit of the European Council in March 2000, and has been 
repeatedly emphasized ever since as a key strategy to turn the 
European Union (EU) into the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world.5  Scholars have identified 
measures that increase the quantity and quality of the stock of human 
capital as important aspects of any growth-promoting policy 
package.6  As employees have acquired their new status as resources 
for corporate investment, the protection of employees’ interests 
becomes increasingly important. 
In terms of corporate governance and company law, 
considering the interests of the company’s employees has long been 
required in the decision-making of a company’s management.  The 
current debate has advanced our thinking about the effective and 
appropriate governance of the modern corporation, the nature of 
business ethics or corporate social responsibility, and the extent to 
which these progressive thoughts should be imposed through duties 
upon companies or practiced by employers through their business 
 
3 For examples, see David J. Teece, Capturing Value from Knowledge Assets: The 
New Economy, Markets for Know-How, and Intangible Assets,  40 CAL. MGMT. 
REV. 55  (1998); Christian Lyhne Ibsen & Kathleen Thelen, Diverging Solidarity 
Labor Strategies in the New Knowledge Economy, 69 WORLD POL. 409 (2017); 
FISK, supra note 1. 
4 GILES PROCTOR & LILIAN MILES, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 56 (2002). 
5 European Commission Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs 
Unit A.1, Human Capital in a Global and Knowledge-based Economy: Final 
Report, at IV (May, 2002). 
6 Id. at 11. 
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judgements. 7   The discussion of the importance to be given to 
employees’ interests has become a part of the ongoing process of 
company law reform.  We have witnessed cases in which the interests 
of employees in developing countries were harmed by the 
misconducts of multinational enterprises.8  The British Home Stores 
(BHS) scandal in the UK that put employees’ pensions at risk, for 
example, reminds us of the significance of employee protection in 
public companies.9 
Inevitably, this creates questions about the transportability of 
“best practices” of corporate governance, particularly in Anglo-
American shareholder-oriented countries where employees’ interests 
have not traditionally been the central managerial concerns.  
Therefore, changes to the world economy have created a need to 
address the new demands of companies, employees and society, and 
to fundamental re-think principles of company law and policy.  A 
 
7 See, e.g., Sally Wheeler, Labor and the Corporation, 6 J. CORP. L. STUD. 361, 
388–96 (2006); for discussions on the other side of the debate, see Milton 
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-
friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html 
[https://perma.cc/83SP-RHTD]. 
8  See Connelly v. RTZ Corp. plc [1997] UKHL 30, [1999] CLC 533 (Eng.) 
(recognizing rights of an employee to bring employment claims before the British 
courts on grounds of substantial justice, despite forum non conveniens 
applicability); Lubbe v. Cape Plc. and Related Appeals [2000] 1 WLR 1545 (Eng.), 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2000/41.html [https://perma.cc/33C7-CFST] 
(regarding plea of forum non conveniens as not sustainable on the ground that the 
case may be tried more suitably in favor of employees and victims in other forums); 
Newton-Sealey v. Armorgroup Services Ltd. [2008] EWHC 233 (QB) (Eng.), 
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5a8ff74060d03e7f57eaa691# 
[https://perma.cc/Y6UB-8E8Z] (attributing duty of care liability to several 
corporations part of a corporate group); Chandler v. Cape [2012] 1 WLR 3111 
(Eng.), https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5a8ff71960d03e7f57ea77ca 
[https://perma.cc/HW86-HHHH] (establishing responsibility of a parent company 
for the health and safety of its subsidiary company’s employees); Okpabi and others 
v. Royal Dutch Shell Plc and another [2018] EWCA 191 (Eng.). 
9 See Paddy Ireland, From Lonrho to BHS: The Changing Character of Corporate 
Governance in Contemporary Capitalism, 29 KING’S L.J. 3, 5–6 (2018) (discussing 
the ethic deprivation in modern-day capitalism); see also FINANCIAL REPORTING 
COUNCIL, WATES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR LARGE PRIVATE 
COMPANIES, 2018 (Eng.) (introducing corporate governance standards for large 
private companies based on their economic and social significance and comparable 
risks to a wide a range of stakeholders).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss3/2
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number of questions therefore arise:  If human capital is so important 
in the new economy, what are the necessary measures for protecting 
the interests of employees with their new status as human capital, in 
order to promote the competence of the company?  Does the adoption 
of the stakeholder approach the right way to make corporate directors 
more responsive to employees’ interests?  What are the mechanisms 
available in the domain of company law, and are they effective in 
promoting employees’ interests?  
The Article starts with an introduction to the concept of the 
new economy and an analysis of the relationships between the new 
economy, corporate governance, and human capital.  Second, the 
Article discusses the interests of employees in the new economy, 
especially with regard to their position as primary stakeholders who 
have a crucial and indispensable responsibility in promoting the 
success of the company.  Following that discussion, arguments are 
presented regarding the protection of employees’ interests through a 
heightened duty supported by information disclosure in the 
Enlightened Shareholder Value (ESV) model in the UK company law, 
and the more diverse board structure supported by soft law 10 
approaches embedded in Chinese Company law. 
 
THE NEW ECONOMY, STAKEHOLDERS’ INTERESTS, AND 
HUMAN CAPITAL 
Initially appearing in Time in 1983,11 the term “new economy” 
has been widely employed in a large amount of literature, although 
there is no agreed definition of the term. 12  However, a common 
feature shared by all academics in their use of the concept is the 
emphasis on the significance of information.  Generally speaking, the 
 
10 “Soft law” is defined by OECD as “co-operation based on instruments that are 
not legally binding, or whose binding force is somewhat ‘weaker’ than that of 
traditional law, such as codes of conduct, guidelines, roadmaps, peer reviews.”  
OECD, SOFT LAW, https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/irc10.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9S6J-XHV3] (last visited June 30, 2020).  
11 See Charles P. Alexander, The New Economy, TIME (May 30, 1983) 
http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,926013-1,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/5CXZ-B8TX]. 
12 Jack E. Triplett, Economic Statistics, the New Economy, and the Productivity 
Slowdown, 34 BUS. ECON. 13, 13–5 (1999). 
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new economy has been defined by economists in both broad and 
narrow perspectives.  In the broad perspective, some scholars traced 
this concept to the 1991 economic expansion in the US, which is 
characterized by strong growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) 
and per capita GDP, higher rates of investment, as well as low 
inflation and unemployment.13  Gavyn et al. redefined the notion as a 
“new paradigm” with driving forces including technical progress, 
globalisation, product market structure modifications, and labour 
market structure modifications.14  Three basic characteristics of the 
new economy can be derived from the foregoing:  first, there is a 
strong GDP growth; second, there is a drop in unemployment and 
inflation; and most importantly, there is a trend towards long-term 
wealth creation, which mainly results from the significant 
technological innovations from the mid-1990s onwards.15  
As for the narrow perspective, the term “new economy” 
incorporates the development of information technology and the 
internet, together with their impact on the economy.  Gordon 
understands the term as an equivalent to an acceleration in the rate of 
technical advances in information technology (IT).  However, he does 
not take into account its contribution prior to 1995 when he defines 
the new economy as encompassing the mid-1990s acceleration in the 
rate of price decline in computer hardware, the corollary of an 
acceleration of exponential growth rate of computer power, and the 
wildfire speed of development of the Internet.16  Similarly, Bosworth 
and Triplett focus on the role of IT as an accelerator of the economy’s 
rate of output and productivity growth when they claim that the new 
economy embraces IT developments, namely computers, peripherals, 
computer software, communications, and related equipment.17 
 
13 Barbara M. Fraumeni & Steven J. Landefeld, Measuring the New Economy, 81(3) 
SURV. CURRENT BUS. 23, 23–25 (2001).  
14 Nicola Jentzsch, The New Economy Debate in the U.S.: A Review of Literature 
in PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 80, 84 (L.A. Finley ed., 2006) (quoting 
Gavyn Davies, Martin Brookes & Neil Williams, Technology, the Internet and the 
New Global Economy, in GOLDMAN SACHS GLOB. ECON. PAPER NO: 39 (2002)). 
15 See generally Nicola Jentzsch, The New Economy Debate in the US: A Review of 
Literature (John F. Kennedy Inst. for N. Am. Studies, Section of Econ., Working 
Paper No. 125, 2001) (introducing different definitions of the New Economy). 
16 Robert J. Gordon, Does the New Economy Measure up to the Great Inventions of 
the Past?, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 49 (2000). 
17 Barry P. Bosworth & Jack E. Triplett, What’s New About the New Economy? IT, 
Economic Growth and Productivity, BROOKINGS INST. 1, 1–3 (Dec. 12, 2000), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss3/2
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The next question concerns with what makes the new 
economy new.  Atkinson and Court argue that compared to the 
traditional economy, the new economy is “a knowledge and idea-
based economy where the keys to wealth and job creation are the 
extent to which ideas, innovation, and technology are embedded in 
all sectors of the economy.”18  Along with notable improvements in 
technology, production, and trading patterns across the world, 
companies increasingly face competition on an international level.  
The rule of the game in this type of competition is that the fast eats 
the slow.  Dot com companies and network companies constitute new 
organisational forms of corporations, with flexible, devolved, and 
interconnected subsystems.  The key drivers in supporting enterprise 
are people and their knowledge and capabilities.19  The success of a 
company is measured by the market price of the entire company, 
which is influenced by elements like share price, reputation of the 
company, value of the trademark, and so on.  Leadership is always 
based on a shared power structure, with employee empowerment and 
self-leadership.  Employees are regarded as an investment of the 
company.  In contrast, in the old economy, the preconditions for states’ 
economic success included issues such as low costs; abundant, 
basically skilled labor; and good transportation and other physical 
infrastructure.”20  In this system, the key driver to the growth of an 
enterprise is capital. 21   The rule of the game for this type of 
competition is that the big eats the small; the success of the company 
is measured by profit; and the leadership of the company is purely 
vertical.  The employees are seen as expenses of the company.  
 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20001020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6S7P-R64Z].  
18 ROBERT D. ATKINSON, RANDOLPH H. COURT & JOSEPH M. WARD, THE STATE 
NEW ECONOMY INDEX REPORT: BENCHMARKING ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN 
THE STATES 5 (Jul. 1999), http://www2.itif.org/1999-state-new-economy-index.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G55G-XRKB].  
19 For more discussions on knowledge-based economy, see Richard G. Harris, The 
Knowledge‐based Economy: Intellectual Origins and New Economic 
Perspectives 3 INT’L J. MGMT REV. 21, 21 (2002). 
20 ATKINSON ET AL, supra note 18, at 6. 
21 PETER J. VAN BAALEN & LARS T. MORATIS, MANAGEMENT EDUCATION IN THE 
NETWORK ECONOMY: ITS CONTEXT, CONTENT, AND ORGANIZATION 33 (2001).  
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The New Economy and Corporate Governance  
Continuing changes in the business world, including the 
widespread employment of new technologies, the globalization of the 
economy and society, and increasing competition in both the public 
and private sectors, have all had a great impact on the transformation 
of organizations’ internal structures, strategies and management 
approaches.22 
Before discussing employees as a primary stakeholder in a 
company, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss the notion of a 
“stakeholder.”  The term first appeared in management literature in 
an internal memorandum at the Stanford Research Institute in 1963.23  
The use of “stakeholder” to refer to a variety of constituencies who 
participate in a business has been commonly accepted since the 1980s, 
after the publication of Freeman’s Strategic Management, a landmark 
book in business literature.24  In that book, the concept of stakeholders 
is defined as “those groups without whose support the organization 
would cease to exist”, originally including shareowners, employees, 
customers, lenders and society.25  The most famous and frequently 
cited definition is given in an essay by Evan and Freeman, where 
stakeholders are described as “those groups who have a stake in or 
claim on the firm.”26  According to the relationship between their 
interests and the company, stakeholders can be divided into primary 
stakeholders and secondary stakeholders.  They can be also divided 
into internal and external stakeholders, depending on whether they 
are members of the company. 
As a key stakeholder group, employees have an interest in the 
company since it provides their livelihood, and at some point in the 
future after they retire, employees may also benefit financially from 
 
22 Gillian Shapiro, Employee Involvement: Opening the Diversity Pandora’s Box?, 
29 PERSONNEL REV. 304 (2000) (exploring the impact of employee diversity on 
efficient business management). 
23 Elaine Sternberg, The Defects of Stakeholder Theory, 5 SCHOLARLY RES. & 
THEORY PAPERS 3 (1997). 
24 R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 
(1984) (exploring various management and stakeholder strategies on corporations). 
25 Id. at 31–32. 
26 William Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern 
Corporation in An Introduction to BUSINESS ETHICS 254, 255 (George D. 
Chryssides, John H. Kaler eds., 1993). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss3/2
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the company’s pension scheme.27  In return, employees can enhance 
the innovation and sustainable development of their company by 
providing their own expertise and experiences.  They are the ones 
who invent and produce products, deliver their professional services 
to the company, create its profits, and represent it to the external 
world. 28   Employees tend to have a strong and interdependent 
relationship with the company they work for.  On the one hand, 
employees are concerned with the company’s important strategies, 
such as working conditions, pension schemes and so on.  By virtue of 
their length of service and the relative inflexibility of their bond with 
the company, for example, their livelihood which is dependent on 
their employment, employees strive to secure their interests within 
the company.29   On the other hand, the company’s development, 
especially the implementation of long-term strategies, largely 
depends on its employees’ recognition and performance of corporate 
strategic plans and employees’ participation 30  in the corporate 
governance. 
Traditionally, under the shareholder value principle which 
dominates in the UK, the role played by employees in corporate 
governance has not been as active as that of their counterparts in 
countries in Continental Europe.  It has been found that the main 
methods of communication between UK management teams and their 
employees were one-way—for instance, staff newsletters, notice 
boards and emails 31—in which employees functioned as inactive 
receivers rather than dynamic involvers.  The unions who represent 
the employees have suffered an overall decline in membership,32 and 
 
27 CHRISTINE MALLIN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 70–71 (4th ed. 2013). 
28 Janet Williamson, A Trade Union Congress Perspective on the Company Law 
Review and Corporate Governance Reform since 1997, 41 BRITISH J. INDUS. REL. 
511, 514 (2003) (examining Corporate Governance reforms and their impact on 
employee and stockholder relationships). 
29  Company law requires directors to take account of employees’ interests in 
matters affecting the company.  However, there is no enforcement mechanism for 
employees to use when directors fail to take account of their employees’ interests.  
See Companies Act 1985, §§ 309, 719 (UK).  See also Insolvency Act 1986, §187 
(UK). 
30 See Henry Hansmann, Worker Participation and Corporate Governance, 43 U. 
TORONTO L. J. 589, 
31 PROCTOR & MILES, supra note 4, at 56. 
32  Based on the figures to date, memberships fell from 8,939,000 in 1989 to 
7,321,000 between 1999 and 2000.  Figures based on data collected by 
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their influence on the management and governance of companies has 
been seriously undermined.33   
Since the 1990s, however, with society becoming 
progressively more knowledge and information-based, employees are 
increasingly being considered as assets of the company.  As one of 
the company’s biggest overheads in terms of cost,34 the success of the 
business cannot be achieved if excellent, highly educated people are 
not attracted to work there.  In knowledge-based industries—for 
instance, the software and pharmaceutical industries—employees 
have become the key to success because companies are so heavily 
dependent on their employees’ knowledge, expertise and active 
involvement in order to outperform other companies.  Employees in 
these industries are generally regarded as non-substitutable, since 
they are often specialists in certain areas.  Due to the company’s 
reliance on their expertise, they are very difficult to replace.   
Even in the case of substitutable employees, their interests 
cannot be ignored.  Some employee organisations, by using methods 
such as strikes, can easily put companies into difficulties.  Given the 
employees’ increasing significance in corporate development, it has 
even been suggested by stakeholder proponents that employees and 
shareholders should both be recognised as residual claimants of the 
company. 35   If the preferential consideration of shareholders’ 
interests can be justified by the claim that they bear the greatest risk 
relative to other stakeholders, there is a similar justification for 
treating the employees’ interest in the same manner.  Employees 
always find it difficult to obtain a similar job after losing their 
employment when a company becomes insolvent.  Employees also 
bear the risks of loss of income, skills, confidence and health, perhaps 
on a permanent basis.36  Compared to the risks borne by shareholders, 
 
Employment Market Analysis and Research (EMAR) for the Office of National 
Statistics, 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20111108174522/http://www.dius.gov.
uk/policies/employment-matters/research [https://perma.cc/MF74-CKEZ]. 
33 PROCTOR & MILES, supra note 4, at 58. 
34 PROCTOR & MILES, supra note 4, at 56. 
35 Margaret M. Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance 
for the Twenty-First Century, in THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 183 (Thomas Clarke 
ed., 2004). 
36 WILLIAMSON, supra note 28, at 511, 513 (examining Corporate Governance 
reforms and their impact on employee and stockholder relationships). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss3/2
392 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 15 
 
who can and do diversify their risks by holding a portfolio of shares, 
the risks borne by employees seem disproportionately high.  
Therefore, how to modify the traditional shareholder-oriented 
scheme to protect employees’ interest has become an essential issue. 
Employee’ Interests under the Paradigm of the New Economy 
In the new Economy, employees can not only accelerate the 
pace of innovation through their expertise, but also affect the pace at 
which new products gain widespread use and produce significant 
sales.37  Managing employees in this context has special challenges.  
As argued by Grant, “if knowledge is the pre-eminent productive 
resource and most knowledge is created by and stored within 
individuals, then employees are the primary stakeholders.  The 
principal management challenge . . .  is establishing mechanisms by 
which cooperating individuals can co-ordinate their activities in order 
to integrate their knowledge into productive activities.” 38 
In the new economy, more extensive education and training 
are expected from potential employees, to allow the new technologies 
of the company to be developed and adapted.  It is also expected that 
directors should accumulate adequate human capital for research and 
development, in order to ensure long lasting property of the 
company.39  Therefore, the dominant role of employees in the new 
knowledge-based economy promotes a pragmatic consideration of 
stakeholder interests in shareholder-oriented jurisdictions, in order to 
realise the long-term interests of the company.  A basic question 
therefore arises for corporate governance: Should corporate directors 
view themselves solely as stewards of their investors’ capital and aim 
to maximise value for shareholders, or should they view themselves 
instead as custodians of their company’s “human capital” and thus 
concentrate on protecting the interests and developing the knowledge 
and skills of their employees?40 
 
37 FORMAINI & SIEMS, supra note 2, at 1, 2. 
38 Robert M. Grant, The Knowledge-Based View of the Firm: Implications for 
Management Practice, 30 LONG RANGE PLANNING 450, 452 (1997). 
39 JEFFREY H. GREENHAUS & GERARD A CALLANAN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CAREER 
DEVELOPMENT 360 (2006). 
40 Joichi Aoi, To Whom Does the Company Belong? A New Management Mission 
for the Information Age, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE FINANCE AND 
GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS: A COMPARISON OF THE U.S., JAPAN, & EUROPE 244, 246 
(Donald H. Chew ed., 1997). 
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Investment in human capital contributes significantly to 
productivity growth, especially for high technology science-based 
companies.  It is estimated that human capital accounted for 22% of 
the observed productivity growth in the period from 1969 to 1990, 
and 45% of the productivity differential with the sample average in 
1990.41  Employees, as providers of human capital, play a key role in 
fostering innovation and change within their company.  However, 
such contribution has been largely unaccounted for.  It is argued that 
one of the most significant successes of the modern corporation is to 
attract talented workers, who otherwise might have become 
independent entrepreneurs, without offering them ownership, control, 
or even the obligation of directors’ considerations towards their 
interests.42   
Today’s consumers demand customised products, which will 
inevitably result in a more demanding role for employees in terms of 
their initiative and creativity.  Thus, corporate directors should 
identify and encourage the development of the employees’ “human 
assets” in personalised ways and utilization of the employees’ highly 
subjective tastes and idiosyncratic ways of thinking, in order to 
contribute to the company’s success.43  
The massive shift in manufacturing capacity, from Western 
economies to those countries that offer access to cheaper labour, will 
continue to be a significant trend in the era of new economy.  This 
will not only create jobs for local communities in developing 
countries, but will also “create severe pressure for unskilled workers 
in more advanced economies.”44  This transition will also cause social 
problems concerning employment environments in developing 
countries, where the interests of employees cannot be effectively and 
thoroughly protected by employment law.  Disasters might happen 
and unethical working conditions might prevail in developing 
countries due to the negligence of corporate directors.  Meanwhile, 
employees in those countries do not have access to relevant 
information in order to protect themselves, because of their poorly 
 
41  EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EMPLOYMENT AND 
SOCIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 5, at 4. 
42 FISK, supra note 1 at 843 (2005) (exploring metaphors and narratives in context 
of labor and employment law). 
43 AOI, supra note 40, at 247. 
44 PHILIP SADLER, BUILDING TOMORROW’S COMPANY: A GUIDE TO SUSTAINABLE 
BUSINESS SUCCESS 19 (2002). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss3/2
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developed information systems compared with those countries which 
have already transitioned to the new economy. 
For example, in the Bhopal incident in 1984, 20,000 people, 
including employees, were killed or harmed by a chemical leak from 
the American-owned Union Carbide India Limited pesticide plant in 
the city. 45   The leak could have been prevented if procedures, 
management and maintenance at the plant had been more rigorous.  
As a second example, the use of child labour in factories in the 
developing world, whereby multinational companies produce cheap 
products to sell in Western markets, “became an international issue 
in the 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium.”46  In light 
of these examples, there are proposals that directors should have 
regards to employees’ interests, including those employed by their 
subsidiaries or suppliers, as key stakeholders, in order to secure the 
health and safety of their employees.  Multinational enterprises have 
evolved to become complex organisations inculcated with 
personhood, institutional structure, and state-like qualities that have 
a profound impact on our society. 47   The constant issue in the 
discourse on corporate responsibility and corporate objectives is how 
to address the problem of vulnerability and help the constituencies 
such as employees in the developing or the least development 
countries who are particularly vulnerable to the effects of corporate 
actions.  Corporations should be managed in the public interest as 
compensation for the limited liability granted to them by states, and 
governments should only distribute resources on the condition of 
corporations meeting their wider duties. 48   Employees should be 
 
45 Swati Bhasin, Lest We Forget: Bhopal Gas Tragedy That Choked Thousands to 
Death In 1984 (Dec. 3, 2019, 1:13 PM), https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/35-
years-on-bhopal-gas-tragedy-that-choked-thousands-to-death-in-1984-2142537 
[https://perma.cc/S24D-HRRN]. 
46 COLIN FISHER & ALAN LOVELL, BUSINESS ETHICS AND VALUE: INDIVIDUAL, 
CORPORATE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 53 (3rd ed. 2006). 
47  Heather M. Kolinsky, Situating the Corporations within the Vulnerability 
Paradigm: What Impact Does Corporate Personhood Have on Vulnerability, 
Dependency and Resilience, 25 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 51, 52 (2017).  
48 George Shepherd, Not Just Profits: The Fiduciary Duty of Corporate Leaders to 
the Public, Not Just Shareholders 11 (unpublished article, University of Leeds, 
School of Law, UK, A Workshop on Professionalism and Vulnerability October 27–
28, 2017) (on file with authors), 
https://www.slsa.ac.uk/images/2017winter/Professionalismand_vulnerability-
link.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7GA-XXR3]. 
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offered more information about the company by the directors, 
including operational information and safety knowledge.  Also, they 
should be aware of both the domestic and international legal 
requirements and should give local managers sufficient training about 
legal and local ethical policy issues. 
In addition to the information disclosure, employees acting as 
stakeholder directors of the company and participating in the board 
could also help in decision-making.  Since employees are closely 
aligned with key elements of CSR such as working environment or 
the needs of the employees, employee directors will facilitate a better 
environment for the board to explain the rationale underlying its 
decisions.  Therefore, boards with employee directors may promote 
a more explicit recognition and appreciation of stakeholder concerns 
and form a powerful and legitimate representation of a company’s 
power in decisions-making.  Alternatively, the company could 
organize periodic stakeholder meetings with participation by its 
employees, in order to give employees an opportunity to stay 
involved in the operation of the company.  Realistically, these 
meetings could be held annually, adopting a similar format to 
shareholders’ annual meetings, in order to provide a way to achieve 
strategic objectives through stakeholder communication initiating 
and facilitating “respectful, honest and productive multi‐lateral 
communication with their stakeholders.” 49   These meetings also 
allow stakeholders to have adequate time to think about proposals and 
suggestions.  Such annual meetings will also allow employees to 
consider all the factors raised by stakeholders in their catalogue.  
These meetings will be educational and informational for both board 
members and stakeholder participants.  They will not only deal with 
general inquiries and feedback but also cover issues surrounding the 
risks and challenges that the company might face in the future.  A 
well-attended and useful meeting will reflect a well-maintained 
relationship between the company and its employees.   
 
49 James Noland & Robert Phillips, Stakeholder Engagement, Discourse Ethics and 
Strategic Management, 12 INT’L J. MGMT. REV. 39, 48 (2010). 
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PROTECTION OF THE INTERESTS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER 
ENGLISH COMPANY LAW 
The UK has been regarded as a leader in the Anglo-American 
countries in terms of its transition towards the Continental model.  
This comes as a result of integrating stakeholder considerations into 
the narrowly defined objective of shareholder value in its company 
law.  The objective is achieved by the recent introduction of the ESV 
principle, which requires directors to take stakeholders’ interests into 
consideration, and the rapid growth of CSR activities.50  The ESV 
principle explicitly advocates a shift in focus towards the long-term 
interests of the company, which requires the directors of the company 
to recognize and report the effects of their business performance on 
various non-shareholder constituencies, such as employees, 
communities and the environment.  The goal of the company law 
legislation in the UK’s appears to be the maintenance of “its 
corporations’ financial accountability to a constituency of dispersed, 
independent shareholders while simultaneously using market forces 
to nudge companies in the direction of greater social responsibility” 
by taking stakeholders’ interests into account.51  
“Whether it is a question of fair wages and conditions, sexual 
harassment in the workplace”, or maybe just the employees taking 
advantage of company resources, such as the phone or the internet, 
for personal use, “employee-related ethical problems are unavoidable 
for most cotemporary mangers.”52  This Article only focuses on the 
employment issues that should be considered by managers and 
directors under company law, rather than employment law and 
pension law in general, although directors’ duties in those areas are 
also significant. 
 
50 Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion 
of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493, 
550 (2005); Simon Deakin, The Coming Transformation of Shareholder Value, 13 
CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV 11, 16 (2005). 
51 WILLIAMS & CONLEY, supra note 50, 500 (2005). 
52 ANDREW CRANE & DIRK MATTEN, BUSINESS ETHICS:  A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
MANAGING CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION 286 (4th ed. 2016). 
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Legislative Attempts before the Companies Act 2006 
Based on the idea that company law and labor law were in 
essence separate fields of regulatory policies,53 English company law 
statutes before the 1970s paid little attention to employees’ interests.  
The interests of employees and their relationships with employers 
were mainly defined and protected through labour and employment 
legislations, including the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996) 
and the Employment Regulations Act 1999 (ERA 1999). 54  
Employees were perceived as having no legitimate interests in the 
business of the company or its assets, and directors owed no duties 
towards the employees.  Therefore, employees might only benefit 
from the directors’ decisions when the interest of employees is 
consistent with that of the shareholders. 55   In Hampton v Price’s 
Patent Candle Co., it was held that keeping the workforce happy and 
satisfied was a prudent capitalist policy, but it was not a legal 
requirement.56  The refusal of the court to consider the interests of 
employees was once again reflected by the operation of the ultra vires 
rule in Hutton v. West Cork Rwy. Co. Ltd., in which the Court of 
Appeal confirmed that it was beyond the capacity of a company to 
make gratuitous payments to past or present employees.57  In sum, in 
the early years of the UK company law, directors were not required 
to consider employees’ interests. 
As a consequence of the increasing interactions between 
businesses and employees in practice,58 employees’ interests were 
 
53  HANSMANN, supra note 30, at 589; Steven Anderman, Termination of 
Employment: Whose Property Rights?, in THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW 101, 126 
(Catherine Barnard, Simon Deakin & Gillian Morris eds., 2004). 
54 PROCTOR & MILES, supra note 4, at 54. 
55 See Hutton v. West Cork Rwy. Co. Ltd. [1883] 23 Ch. D. 654 (AC) (holding that 
directors may only spend money “for the purposes which are reasonably incidental 
to the carrying on of the business of the company” and thus are not free to pay the 
employees); see also David Milman, From Servant to Stakeholder: Protecting the 
Employee Interests in Company Law, in CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW: 
MODERN DEVELOPMENTS 149 (David Feldman & Frank Meisel eds., 1996). 
56 Hampton v Price’s Patent Candle Co. [1876] 44 LJ Ch 437. 
57 Hutton v. West Cork Rwy. Co. Ltd. [1883] 23 Ch. D. 654, 671. 
58 See Charlotte Villiers, UK Report on the Employer and the Relationship between 
Labour Law and Company Law (2000), 
http://www.dirittodellavoro.it/public/current/miscellanea/atti/pontignano2000/Vill
iers.html [https://perma.cc/V7N2-63LT] (discussing the similarity between 
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first recognised in UK company law in the government white paper 
on company law in 1977. 59   In 1977, the Bullock Report 60  on 
Industrial Democracy was set up by the Labour government of the 
day, in order to advocate for a radical extension of industrial 
democracy through requiring that unions be given the right in law to 
protect employees’ interests.  There were three proposals considered 
by the Bullock Committee.  First, the Committee considered the 
establishment of a Trade Union Council, which would have given 
trades unions the right to demand that employees elect half of the 
directors in large companies.61  Second, there was also a proposal for 
the establishment of an Eurasian Economic Commission, which 
would require large companies to have a supervisory council in 
addition to an executive board, in which one third of the members 
would be elected by the company employees. 62   Third, it was 
proposed by the Confederation of British Industry that companies 
should be required to negotiate employee representation schemes 
with their own employees, without any legislation to prescribe format 
or proportions.63 
The Bullock Committee concluded by recommending the 
creation of a commission to observe, encourage and recommend 
specific steps for employee representation.64  In detail, it was required 
that employees “should have equal right with shareholder to 
representation on board of private companies employing two 
thousand or more” employees. 65   Unlike in some Continental 
European countries, this representation take place through trade 
union machinery, rather than by all the employees.66  However, the 
response of the Confederation of British Industry was “almost 
uniformly antagonistic.” 67   In response to the universal hostile 
 
relationship between business decisions and employment relationships). 
59 H.M.S.O., THE CONDUCT OF COMPANY DIRECTORS, 1977, Cmnd. 7037, at 2 (UK). 
60  LORD BULLOCK, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY ON INDUSTRIAL 
DEMOCRACY, 1977, Cmnd. 6706, at 84. 
61 Id. at 26–28. 
62 Id. at 28–30. 
63 Id. at 30–32. 
64 Id. at 160–166. 
65  Ben Clift, Andrew Gamble & Michael Harris, The Labour Party and the 
Company, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY 51, 77 (John Parkinson, 
Andrew Camble & Gavin Kelly eds., 2000). 
66 Id. 
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attitude from business and lack of enthusiasm in the Cabinet, after 
consultations, a White Paper on Industrial Democracy appeared in 
May 1978 as a “much diluted form of the Bullock Report.” 68  
Eventually, the Labor government lost power before any of these 
proposals were actually adopted by Parliament.  After the return of a 
Conservative government in 1979, the issue of employee 
involvement was removed from the political agenda.69 
Apart from the unsuccessful attempt by the Bullock Report to 
protect employees’ interests, directors’ duties to consider the interests 
of their employees were also recognized in 1977, when a government 
white paper, Conduct of Company Directors, acknowledges that 
directors ought to consider their employees’ interests: 
The Government believes that employees should be 
given legal recognition by company law. The statutory 
definition of the duty of directors will require directors 
to take into account the interests of employees as well 
as of shareholders. They will also be required to send 
the annual report to all employees as well as to 
shareholders.70 
A Companies Bill in 1978 also proposes the statutory 
codification of directors’ duties towards employees.71  It is provided 
in Clause 46 of the Bill that: “The matters to which the directors of 
the company are to have regard in the performance of their functions 
shall include the interests of the company’s employees generally, as 
well as the interests of its members.”72  However, the Bill was never 
enacted since it had lapsed by the 1979 General Election.73   
 
Post-War Consensus, Contemporary British History, 30 CONTEMP. BRIT. HIST. 119, 
119 (2016). 
68 CLIFT, GAMBLE & HARRIS, supra note 65, at 80. 
69 See Adrian Williamson, The Bullock Report on Industrial Democracy and the 
Post-War Consensus, Contemporary British History, 30 CONTEMP. BRI. HIST. 119, 
135–137 (2016). 
70 DEPARTMENT OF TRADE, THE CONDUCT OF COMPANY DIRECTORS, 1977, Cmnd. 
7037 (Eng.). 
71 Companies Bill 1978, §46 (Eng.). 
72 Companies Bill 1978, §46 (Eng.). 
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Assessment of Article 309 
The first company statute to acknowledge employees’ 
interests was the Companies Act 1985,74 in which it is stated that “the 
matters to which the directors of a company are to have regard in the 
performance of their functions include the interests of the company’s 
employees in general, as well as the interests of its members.” 75  
Under company law legislation, Section 309 of the Companies Act 
1985 imposes a statutory duty upon directors to consider the interests 
of employees when carrying out their duties, and disclose information 
in annual reports about employees and employment practices.  
Section 309 specifically states that the duty it imposes on directors is 
owed exclusively to the company and enforceable in the same way as 
other fiduciary duties owed to a company.  This means that the duty 
to consider the interests of employees “can be enforced only by the 
directors themselves or by shareholders through derivative action.”76  
Moreover, the duty is not a great burden for the directors since the 
law simply requires the directors to consider the employees, rather 
than acting in their best interests.  According to the statute, it is 
enough merely for directors “to have regard” to their employees’ 
interests, a provision by which it created a defense for directors who 
have prioritized employees’ interests over those of members.77  The 
Section has not provided any legal mechanisms that could be used by 
employees or employee representatives to enforce the duty; therefore, 
it has been rarely invoked in the courts.78  Moore argued that Section 
309 “served to detract from, rather than reaffirmed primacy of 
 
74 See The Companies Act 1985, § 719 (Eng.); The Insolvency Act 1986, § 187 
(Eng.) (discussing the interests of employees, granting the power to a company to 
make gratuitous provision for employees on the cessation of a company’s business, 
even though this provision “is not in the best interests of the company”). 
75 The Companies Act 1985, §309 (Eng.). 
76 See WANJIRU NJOYA, PROPERTY IN WORK: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FIRM 158 (2007). 
77 Alistair Alcock, An Accidental Change to Directors' Duties? 30 COMP. L. 362, 
365 (2009). 
78 John Armour, Simon Deakin & Suzanne J. Konzelmann, Shareholder Primacy 
and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance, 41 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 531, 537 
(2003). 
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shareholders as a corporate beneficiary.” 79   Section 309 was 
effectively a “statutory provision without teeth.”80 
From a practical point of view, Parkinson also argued against 
certain deficiencies of Section 309 when he pointed out that the 
Section would not have much effect on the way companies operate in 
practice.81  This is because the duty imposed by Section 309 is a 
subjective duty.  Directors “must act in accordance with what they 
believe to be an appropriate balancing of sometimes conflicting 
interests,”82 while the court is unable to “intervene merely because it 
disagrees with the way in which the directors have weighted those 
interests.”83  Further, there is no guidance in the Section for how 
directors should interpret their responsibility under the provision.  
There is also no guidance about directors’ direction, or about a 
practical method for how directors should balance the interests of 
shareholders and employees “or the relative weight which can be 
given to the interests of employees.”84  Managerial strategies will 
mostly be based on the unrestricted discretion of the directors. 
Furthermore, this specific duty appears to be unenforceable 
because there is no direct means of enforcing it, either individually or 
collectively.  According to Section 309 (2), “the duty is owed to the 
company (and the company alone) and is enforceable in the same way 
as any other fiduciary duty owed to a company by its directors.”85  
Therefore, if the employees of the company and other parties hope to 
challenge the directors’ decisions and conduct, they must bring the 
actions derivatively through the company.  If the people in control of 
the company at the relevant time do not authorize the company to 
bring an action against the directors, the employees will have no 
 
79 MARC MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE 192 
(2013). 
80 See John Farrar & BRENDA HANNIGAN, FARRAR’S COMPANY LAW 302 (1998). 
81 JOHN EDWARD PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN 
THE THEORY OF COMPANY LAW 83–84 (1995). 
82 Id. at 84. 
83 Id. at 84. 
84 See Simon Goulding & Lilian Miles, Regulating the Approaches of Companies 
towards Employees: The New Statutory Duties and Reporting Obligations of 
Directors within the United Kingdom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE 
LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY 90 (Stephen Tully ed., 2005). 
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remedy under Section 309, even when their interests have been 
adversely affected by those actions.86 
Moreover, proceedings for breach of fiduciary duties may, 
under certain circumstances, be commenced in the derivative form by 
a member of a company on the company’s behalf.  “This raises the 
possibility of an employee with a shareholding being allowed to 
enforce the section 309 duty derivatively.”87  However, recent rulings 
effectively “bar any derivative action that does not have the approval 
of a majority of shareholders other than those who are defendant.”88  
Therefore, the only way that Section 309 might be enforced would be 
if employees are also shareholders who own a majority of shares in 
the company, and they subsequently bring an action against the 
directors.  Therefore, “Fitting such a claim into the requirements for 
a derivative action would, however, demand greater judicial 
creativity than can perhaps in the circumstances be realistically 
expected.” 89   It is also significant to stress that Section 309 is 
permissive rather than mandatory, and that it clearly states that the 
employees cannot sue for any breach of duty owed to them.  These 
characteristics—the non-mandatory nature and the lack of direct 
standing to sue—are also typical of current constituency statutes in 
the US.90 
Despite all those deficiencies, Section 309 is still a positive 
and significant provision, which “represents a tentative step towards 
recognising the employees’ role in an enterprise.91  Nevertheless, the 
Company Law Review Steering Group stipulated that Section 309 
should be repealed. 92   In their view, there was a danger that the 
Section might be interpreted as enabling directors to prefer 
employees’ interests over those of shareholders, which would 
threaten the principle of shareholder supremacy. 93   Therefore, 
 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88  Leonard S. Sealy, Director’s Wider Responsibilities—Problems Conceptual, 
Practical and Procedural, 13 MONASH U. L. REV. 164, 184 (1987). 
89 PARKINSON, supra note 81, at 83. 
90  See Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee 
Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227 (2004). 
91 See JOHN H. FARRAR & BRENDA HANNIGAN, FARRAR’S COMPANY LAW 386 
(1998). 
92  See Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a 
Competitive Economy: Strategic Framework, §§5.1.20–5.1.23 (1999). 
93 Id. at §§5.1.21. 
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directors should consider employees’ interests only in the process of 
promoting shareholders’ interests.94  This argument is not convincing, 
since it fails to consider the importance of sustaining the relationship 
between shareholders and other stakeholders, including employees, 
in the process of pursuing the objective of long-term shareholder 
value. 
Information Disclosure and the Operating and Financial Review 
The traditional functions of disclosure include reducing 
information asymmetries and avoiding market failure.95  Open, clear, 
interactive and honest reporting will assist the company in building 
sustainable relationships with stakeholders.  The European 
Commission alleges that transparency in regards to information on 
environmental and social matters leads to better corporate 
performance over time, reduces financing costs, attracts and retains 
talented employees, meaning that such a company is ultimately more 
successful.96  As an essential element of the accountability approach 
to company law, disclosure is designed to demonstrate corporate 
commitment, and to increase the public’s understanding and 
awareness of corporate social performance.97  Justice Brandeis stated 
that the purpose of disclosure (publicity) is “a remedy for social and 
industrial diseases” as “sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants[.]”98 
The Company Law Review (“CLR”) proposed that 
companies of economic significance should prepare an Operating and 
Financial Review (“OFR”), which is intended to be qualitative in 
character, containing all the information pertinent to assessing the 
performance and future prospects of a company, including its 
relationships with its employees and its impact on the community and 
 
94 Id at §§5.1.23. 
95 BARNALI CHOUDHURY & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE DUTIES TO THE PUBLIC 
77–78 (2019).  
96 European Commission, Disclosure of Non-financial and Diversity Information 
by Large Companies and Groups—Frequently Asked Questions (Apr. 15, 2014), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_14_301 
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97 Kellye Y Testy, Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social 
Movements, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1227, 1235 (2002).  
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environment.99  It was acknowledged by the CLR that stakeholders 
such as employees “had a legitimate interest in the company’s 
activities, particularly in the case of companies which exercise 
significant economic power.” 100   OFR should provide necessary 
information judged by the directors judge “for an understanding of 
the business, such as relationships with employees, suppliers and 
customers, environmental and community impact, corporate 
governance and management of risk.”101 
After an extensive public consultation process, the British 
“parliament passed a statute, requiring 1,290 British-based 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, the New York 
Stock Exchange or NASDAQ publish an OFR” on May 21, 2004.102  
The new OFR requires companies to identify material, social and 
environmental risks, and to disclose information about those risks.103  
The regulation has operated to give much greater prominence to 
issues related to corporate social and environmental responsibilities.  
The purpose of the OFR is to give directors a chance to 
explain to shareholders and other stakeholder issues such as how they 
have looked after their social responsibilities, their employees, the 
environment, consumers and the community.  The OFR is regarded 
as a safeguard against the negative implications and effects of an 
excessive focus on short-term shareholder returns.  The ultimate aim 
of this inclusive approach is to be achieved by companies establishing 
successful relationships with members of the supply chain, the 
community and the environment.104 
It is also proposed by the White Paper that rather than 
imposing duties on the directors, “wider interests” will be taken care 
of by providing “a narrative report covering the main factors 
underlying the company’s performance and which is intended to give 
a broader view of the company’s operations than the purely financial 
 
99 Robert Goddard, Modernising Company Law: The Government’s White Paper, 
66 MOD. L. REV. 402, 405 (2003). 
100 COMPANY LAW REVIEW, MODERN COMPANY LAW: FINAL REPORT, §§ 3.28–30 
(2001).  
101 MODERN COMPANY LAW: FINAL REPORT, supra note 100, at 19 (2001). 
102 Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Triumph or Tragedy—The Curious Path 
of Corporate Disclosure Reform in the U.K., 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 
REV. 317, 317 (2007). 
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reports” 105 —–namely the OFR. 106   The report is intended to be 
qualitative (e.g. including the balance sheet) and historical (e.g. 
reporting past years’ financial results).  It is also intended to cover 
internal company matters (e.g. the size of the workforce) and contain 
all the information that is material to an assessment of the company’s 
performance and future prospects, including its relationship with its 
employees, customers and suppliers and its impact on the community 
and environment. 107   The government also made suggestions on 
proposed legislation for the OFR, to shed light on its important role 
in company reporting.108 
The legal requirement for quoted companies109 to provide an 
OFR was once again stipulated in the Company Law Bill 2005, in 
which directors were required to prepare an OFR for each fiscal 
year.110  Directors who fail to comply with the requirements will be 
committing an offence, and will be liable to a fine not exceeding a 
statutory maximum. 111   The Secretary of State may also make 
provision by regulation as to the objective and contents of the OFR.112 
However, the legislation and enforcement of the OFR as a 
reporting policy for directors are still open to debate, and further 
modifications are necessary to perfect them.  In practice, if ESV 
means balancing the interests of shareholders and stakeholders for the 
benefit of the long-term interests of a company, the disclosure of 
relevant issues in the OFR cannot by itself generate meaningful 
change in corporate practice as the disclosure measures is only seen 
 
105 The White Paper on Modernising Company Law, HOUSE OF COMMONS TRADE 
AND INDUSTRY COMMITTEE 18 (2002).  A White Paper is an authoritative report and 
is seen as a statement of government policy. 
106 Id. at 18. 
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as one of the dimensions or legislative approaches of the regulatory 
framework to promote interests of stakeholders.113   
Progressive Changes Brought by the Companies Act 2006 
Before the Companies Act 2006, the maximization of 
shareholder wealth was not only a theory, but also a basic feature of 
the corporate ideology and public belief in the UK. 114   As a 
consequence, this legal framework was criticized on the grounds of 
“limiting any accountability to stakeholders within a framework of, 
and to the overall purpose of, profit-maximization for 
shareholders.”115  The UK ESV principle, a newly-defined corporate 
objective of the company, has been set out in the Companies Act 2006, 
stipulated in Section 172 (1).  The ESV principle116 emphasizes the 
significance of coordinating stakeholder relationships for 
corporations’ long-term development, and it also aims to make 
directors aware of the gradual transformation occurring in legal and 
social frameworks in which corporations exist and operate, and to 
allow them to subsequently adjust their managerial routines.  For 
those directors who are enthusiastic in balancing shareholder and 
stakeholder concerns, Section 172 offers them legitimacy in doing so 
and some surety against being sued, provided that their actions 
benefit shareholders too.117  The ESV in new UK company law is a 
significant attempt to introduce stakeholder considerations into the 
previous shareholder-centered corporate governance scheme; it is 
hoped that the growing consideration of stakeholders’ interests in 
codified directors’ duties will be an efficient means of establishing a 
 
113  See Jingchen Zhao, Promoting More Socially Responsible Corporations 
through A Corporate Law Regulatory Framework, 37 LEG. STUD. 103, 115–133 
(2017). 
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115 Janice Dean, Stakeholding and Company Law, 22 COMP. L. 66, 70 (2001). 
116  See generally ANDREW KEAY, THE ENLIGHTENED SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
PRINCIPLE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2013) (offering a comprehensive and in 
detail discussion on ESVP). 
117 Andrew Keay, Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the 
United Kingdom’s ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach’, 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 
577, 599 (2007). 
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long-term corporate culture, and the necessity of corporate disclosure 
will further enhance directors’ regard for stakeholder interests. 
There were no separate sections regarding directors’ duties 
towards employees in the Companies Act 2006.  The legislative 
position with regard to the extent as to which directors of companies 
are required to consider the interests of their employees when making 
management decisions has now been reformulated by Section 172 in 
the context of directors’ duties to promote the success of the 
company.118  Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 emphasized the 
likely consequences of directors’ duties in the long term. 119  
Recognition of the long-term interests of companies is one of the 
major advantages of adopting the stakeholder model in company law.  
The interests of employees, as the primary stakeholders who play a 
significant role in innovation and reform within corporations, are 
certainly crucial in shaping an efficient corporate structure for the 
benefit of the long-term interests of the company. 
Compared to Section 309 in the 1985 Act, Section 172 (1) (b) 
of the 2006 Act gives legitimacy to directors who consider the 
interests of employees.120  This means that where (or to the extent that) 
the purposes of the company consist of or include the purpose of the 
benefit of its employees, it can be asserted that directors’ decisions 
are made with the goal of promoting the success of the company for 
the benefit of its members. Since the success of the company was 
defined clearly in Section 172 (1) (a) as long-term success, 121 
corporate decisions in favor of employees’ interests will be justified 
as long as they are directed at the long-term interests of the 
corporation.  These decisions are common among companies in the 
new knowledge-based economic age, where specific employees are 
hired because of their unique professional knowledge that is crucial 
to product improvements and professional techniques.  Indeed, the 
same holds true for companies that employ irreplaceable employees. 
Functioning alongside directors’ duties, corporate disclosure 
has long been regarded as an important way of enhancing corporate 
accountability and improving the transparency of corporate activities.  
In light of the growing awareness of long-term development and 
 
118 The Companies Act 2006, §172 (1) (b) (Gr. Brit.). 
119 Id. at §172 (1) (a). 
120 Id. at §172 (1) (b). 
121 Id. at §172 (1) (a). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss3/2
408 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 15 
 
stakeholder considerations, there has been an increasing demand for 
corporations to produce reports detailing their commitments to social 
and environmental issues.  A significant modification in the 
Companies Act 2006 is the introduction of the Business Review as 
the replacement of OFR in line with the minimum requirements of 
the EU Accounts Modernisation Directive 2003.  This is announced 
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on November 2005 in a speech 
to the Confederation of British Industry.122  The Directive called for 
a company’s annual report to include “both financial and, where 
appropriate, non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the 
particular business, including information relating to environmental 
and employee matters (when necessary).”123   
After the enforcement of Section 417 of the Companies Act 
2006, “the Directors’ Report and Business Review became the central 
narrative reporting document in the corporate disclosure regime.”124  
The general idea is that the Business Review’s requirements for 
directors will be less onerous on companies but still valuable for 
shareholders and other stakeholders.  Section 417 of the Companies 
Act 2006 makes an amendment on information disclosure 
requirement by requiring directors to include in the Business Review 
“a fair review of the company’s business and a description of the 
principal risks and uncertainties facing the company.” 125   The 
Business Review must “to the extent necessary for an understanding 
of the development, performance or position of the company’s 
business.126  “The amendment places an obligation on the directors of 
public companies to include in their annual business review anything 
that might be a liability to the company’s profits” by incurring 
reputational damages, such as contracts with stakeholders that could 
 
122 The OFR requirement was amended on March 21, 2005 in Schedule 7ZA of the 
Companies Act 1985.  The Companies Act 1985 (Operating and Financial Review 
and Directors' Report etc.) Regulations 2005, 2005 No. 1011 (Gr. Brit.); see also 
Company Law Reform Bill 2005–6, HL Bill [34] cl. 393–95 (Gr. Brit.).  
123 Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 
2003 amending Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 
91/674/EEC on the annual and consolidated accounts of certain types of companies, 
banks and other financial institutions and insurance undertakings, art. 2, 2003 O.J. 
(L 178) 10 (EC).  
124 Olaojo Aiyegbayo & Charlotte Villiers, The Enhanced Business Review: Has It 
Made Corporate Governance More Effective?, J. BUS. L. 699, 699 (2011). 
125 The Companies Act 2006, §417 (3) (Gr. Brit.).  
126 Id. at §417 (5). 
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potentially expose the company to take excessive risk of causing 
social or environmental harm. 127   The purpose of the Business 
Review is “to inform members of the company and help them assess 
how the directors have performed their duty under Section 172.”128  
The obligations imposed on quoted companies are more onerous in 
comparison.  Their Business Reviews must “to the extent necessary 
for an understanding of the development, performance or position of 
the company’s business, include—(a) the main trends and factors 
likely to affect the future development, performance and position of 
the company’s business; and (b) information about—(i) 
environmental matters . . . , (ii) the company’s employees, and (iii) 
social and community issues[.]”129   
However, it is also argued that in order to ensure that the 
Business Review achieves the aim associated with directors’ duties 
to promote the success of the company, it is important to offer more 
guidance to directors to avoid a box-ticking approach and protect 
directors from the increased administrative burden.130  Furthermore, 
it is debatable whether the Review will constitute a genuine account 
of the stewardship of all relationships in which the company is 
involved.  On the positive side, as the second limb of the ESV 
principle embedded in Section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006, 
the requirement for a Business Review can do a good enough job if 
companies embrace the idea underpinning the need for the 
requirement.  It provides legislative support for minimum 
information disclosure in Company Law statutes on environmental 
and social issues.  The requirement is regarded as one of the main 
approaches to the legal enforcement of CSR-related corporate 
strategy.131 
The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ 
Report) Regulations 2013 amended the Companies Act 2006 
 
127 Demetra Arsalidou, The Withdrawal of the Operating and Financial Review in 
the Company Bill 2006: Progression or Regression?, 28 COMPANY LAW. 131, 134 
(2007)  
128 Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 417 (2) (Gr. Brit.).  
129 Id. at § 417 (5).  
130 DAVID CHIVERS, THE COMPANIES ACT 2006: DIRECTORS’ DUTIES GUIDANCE, 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY COALITION 7 (2007). 
131 See David K. Millon, Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility, and 
the Redefinition of Corporate Purpose without Law, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 68, 79–92 (P.M. Vasudev & Susan Watson eds., 2012). 
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regarding issues of information disclosure. 132   Section 417 of the 
Companies Act 2006 was repealed in this amendment.133  Instead of 
a “business review,” companies must now produce a “strategic report” 
pursuant to the new Sections 414A-D in Companies Act 2006. 134  
Similar to the OFR and the Business Review, companies submitting 
strategic reports will need to consider reporting social and 
environmental elements to inform members of the company so that 
the members can assess how the directors have performed their duty 
to promote the success of the company through information about any 
policies of the company in relation to social and environmental 
matters and their effectiveness.135 
The nature and scope of the strategic report principally 
replicate the business review.  However, there are also a few changes 
for quoted companies.  First, apart from environmental matters, 
company employees and social and community issues, 136  quoted 
companies also have to include, “to the extent necessary for an 
understanding of the development, performance or position of their 
business,” information about human rights issues, including 
information on any human rights policy and its effectiveness. 137  
Second, quoted companies also have to include, with the purpose of 
enhancing the requirements on employees:  
[A] breakdown showing, at the end of the financial 
year—(i) the number of persons of each sex who were 
directors of the quoted company; (ii) the number of 
persons of each sex who were senior managers of the 
quoted company and the undertakings consolidated in 
the quoted company’s accounts; and (iii) the number 
of persons of each sex who were employees of the 
quoted company and its consolidated undertakings.138   
 
132  See The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) 
Regulations 2013, §414A–D (Gr. Brit.). 
133 Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulation 2013, 
Explanatory Notes 4 (Gr. Brit.). 
134 Id. at 2. 
135 Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 414C (Gr. Brit.). 
136 Id. at § 417(5). 
137 Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulation 2013, 
2013 No. 1970, pt. 2 (Gr. Brit.). 
138 Id.  
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Third, taking the environmental issues one step further, 
“disclosure concerning greenhouse gas emissions” is introduced in 
Part 7 of the amendment, where a quoted company is required to 
“state the annual quantity of emissions in tonnes of carbon 
dioxide.” 139   Another two terminologies are also introduced to 
ascertain the scope of strategic reports for quoted companies, namely 
“company’s strategy” and “business model.”140  These are terms that 
are repeatedly used in corporate governance codes when discussing 
annual reports,141 long-term corporate value142 and advice from audit 
committees.143  Therefore, this new requirement can be regarded as a 
bridge between the Companies Act and the UK Corporate 
Governance Code, making existing “comply or explain” disclosures 
mandatory.  In the author’s opinion, the new strategic report has not 
substantially changed the requirements embedded in the business 
review.  However, it is encouraging to see that the amendment 
provides more detailed requirements regarding employees’ and 
environmental issues, as well as a recognition of human rights issues 
and links between corporate governance codes and information 
disclosure for quoted companies.  
PROTECTION OF THE INTERESTS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER 
CHINESE COMPANY LAW 
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949, the initial development stage of companies and company-
related policies were related to the strongly centralized planned 
economy in the years between 1949 and 1978.  During that time, the 
Danwei (work unit) was a popular notion, referring to a place of 
employment that was commonly used in the context of state-owned 
enterprises (“SOEs”).  Danwei was a unique organizational structure 
which divided individuals into different groups based on their 
employers.  The term “played an all-encompassing role for urban 
citizens” as danwei of an employee will dictate her “work life, 
political life, economic well-being and, ultimately, membership in 
 
139 Id. at pt. 7. 
140 Id. at pt. 2. 
141 Financial Reporting Council, UK Corporate Governance Code 2012, 2012, § 
C.1.1 (Gr. Brit.).  
142 Id. at § C.1.2. 
143 Id. at § C.3.4. 
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society.”144  At that stage, corporations bore responsibilities beyond 
the scope of corporate responsibility as they should have been borne 
by the government. 
Employees’ interests in China have also been recognized in 
Chinese company law.  The idea of protecting domestic and 
international employees, introduced into China in the 1990s mainly 
through global supply chains, was driven by both internal social 
problems and by economic interests in the global market.145  The 
Chinese government reconsidered its policy and economic 
development goals for the long-term sustainable development of 
China in order to respond to these pressures.  Currently, in the 
Chinese Company Law (hereinafter CCL) 2006 and the Chinese 
Corporate Governance Code 2018, we can observe the following 
legislative initiatives to promote employees’ interests directly or 
indirectly.  
Article 5 on CSR  
Low level of transparency for the legislative process in China 
“leaves it unclear why the legislators finally decided to incorporate 
CSR into the company law.”146  Article 5 of CCL 2018 states that “a 
company shall comply with the laws and administrative regulations, 
social morality, and business morality.  It shall act in good faith, 
accept the supervision of the government and general public, and bear 
social responsibilities.”147  It is implied in Article 5 that commercial 
 
144 Yu Xie & Xiaogang Wu, Danwei Profitability and Earnings Inequality in Urban 
China, 195 CHINA Q. 558, 559 (2008). 
145  JINGCHEN ZHAO, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CONTEMPORARY 
CHINA 69–70 (2014). 
146 Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Window Dressing or 
Structural Change, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 64, 71 (2010). 
147 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa (中华人民共和国公司法) [Company 
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006; revised by the Standing 
Comm, Nat’l People’s Cong., October 26, 2018, effective Oct. 26 2018) ST. 
COUNCIL GAZ., art. 5, 
http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=e797dd968c30e172bdfb&lib=law 
[https://perma.cc/KUF4-GWN5] [hereinafter PRC 2018 Company Law] (China); 
see also Li Xiuxin Yu Qingdao Jiesheng Youxiang Gongsi, Xue Xiaoming Gongsi 
Jiesan Jiufen Zaishen Minshi Panjue (李秀针与青岛杰盛置业有限公司、薛晓明
公司解散纠纷再审民事判决) [Li Xiuxin and Qingdao Jiesheng Real Estate Co., 
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activities of a company have a wider impact on social interests, 
including those of its employees.  Moreover, ethical terms such as 
“business ethics” and “social responsibilities” were introduced in the 
general provisions of CCL to encourage corporate responsibility 
beyond economic and legal responsibility explicitly.148  The Article 
gives directors legitimacy to consider employees’ interests.  Despite 
the fact that Article 5 has been widely criticized for its lack of 
enforceability and effectiveness, the Article has had an educational 
impact on corporations, and affirms the government’s attention to and 
policy support for the recognition of the interests of stakeholders 
through the explicit consideration of CSR in company law.   
Employee Participation and Company Trade Unions  
Employee participation is a broad term, including possible co-
determination measures like employee representation on the 
corporate board, employee representation through labour union, 
collective bargaining arrangements, or sharing ownership with 
employees.  Employees may not always be able protect themselves 
contractually against loss of their human capital investment in the 
company due to the limits of ex ante contractual solutions.149  They 
are somehow as vulnerable as shareholders. 150   Consequently, 
employees’ interests and shareholders’ interests should be considered 
simultaneously by the board of directors.  Employee participation 
may also change employees’ attitudes to work, increase their 
alignment with corporate and management values and consequently 
enhance employee motivation and company performance. 151  
Employee directorship is already a common practice globally, but the 
adoption of this notion can also be observed in jurisdictions that are 
 
Ltd., Xue Xiaoming Company Dissolution Dispute Case], Stanford L. Sch. China 
Guiding Project (Higher People's Ct. of Shandong Province Oct. 23, 2015) (holding 
that it is necessary to consider not only the interests of shareholders but also the 
impact of corporate dissolution on the public interest when judging whether a 
company should be dissolved). 
148 PRC 2018 COMPANY LAW, supra note 147, at art. 5 
149 Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, Protecting the Employment Bargain, U. 
TORONTO L. J. 751, 754–766 (1993). 
150 MICHAEL LOWER, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE: A LEGAL AND 
ETHICAL ANALYSIS 98 (2010) 
151  See JULIETTE SUMMERS & JEFF HYMAN, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AND 
COMPANY PERFORMANCE: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 8–10 (2005). 
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traditionally shareholder value oriented, such as the US and the UK.  
In terms of the UK government’s willingness to accept a proposal for 
stakeholder participation, at the launch of her campaign to become 
the Leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom, Theresa May claimed that “the people who run big 
businesses are supposed to be accountable to outsiders, to non-
executive directors, who are supposed to ask the difficult 
questions.”152  She promised to “have not just consumers represented 
on company boards, but employees as well.”153  May used the term 
“accountable” positively when addressing corporations’ 
responsibilities to outsiders, and she is an advocate of the notion of 
stakeholder participation to benefit the long-term interests of the 
corporations. 
In China, CCL 2018 set out a series of new stipulations 
concerning employee participation.  As far as limited liability 
companies are concerned, based on Article 44 “if a limited liability 
company established by two or more state-owned enterprises or other 
state-owned investors, the board of directors shall include 
representatives of the employees of the companies.  The board of 
directors of any other limited liability company may also include 
representatives of the employees of the company concerned.” 154  
Compared to the old company law, the new company law enlarges 
the scope of employees as internal directors in all forms of companies.  
As for joint stock limited companies, according to Article 109 of CCL 
2018 “the board of directors may include representatives of the 
company's employees.  The representatives of the employees who 
serve as board directors shall be democratically elected through the 
assembly of the representatives of the employees, the assembly of 
employees, or other methods. . .”155  This piece of legislation ensures 
that the voice of employees will be heard and employees’ interests 
will be considered at board meetings when decisions are made.  
Moreover, trade unions play an important role in promoting 
the interests of employees in the Chinese corporate governance model.  
Trade unions generally are regarded as legitimate and effective 
 
152  Theresa May, Home Secretary, Speech to Launch Leadership Campaign in 
Birmingham: We Can Make Britain A Country that Works for Everyone (July 11, 
2016). 
153 Id.  
154 PRC 2018 COMPANY LAW, supra note 147, at art. 45. 
155 Id. at art. 109. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
2020] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 415 
 
deliberative partners with the firm in the trajectory of development 
towards more ethical companies with positive contributions towards 
deliberative democracy.156  According to Article 18 of CCL 2018, a 
company’s employees shall organise a labour union to carry out trade 
union activities and safeguard the lawful rights and interests of the 
employees.157  “The company shall provide necessary conditions for 
its labour union to carry out activities.  The labour union shall, on 
behalf of the employees, sign collective contracts with the company 
with respect to the remuneration, working hours, welfare, insurance, 
work safety and sanitation, and other matters.”158  To make a decision 
about restructuring or any major issues concerning its business 
operation or the formulation of important rules and regulations, a 
company shall solicit opinions from its trade union, and its staff and 
workers through the staff and workers’ congress or other forums.159 
Ethical Elements in Corporate Governance Code 
As a general principle under the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies, a listed company is required to 
“respect the legitimate rights of . . . employees[.]”160  More actively, 
the code also facilitates opportunities and environments for 
protecting the interests of stakeholders, including employees, by 
requiring companies to “provide the necessary conditions to ensure 
the legitimate rights of stakeholders” with “channels for redress for 
infringement of rights.”161  A company shall encourage employee 
feedback regarding the company’s operating and financial situations 
and important decisions affecting employee benefits through direct 
communication with the board of directors, the supervisory board and 
management personnel. Furthermore, communication with 
employees is also encouraged by listening to and reflecting their 
 
156 Geraint Harvey, Andy Hodder & Stephen Brammer, Trade Union Participation 
in CSR Deliberation: An Evaluation, 48 INDUS. REL. J. 42, 42; 51–52 (2017). 
157 PRC 2018 COMPANY LAW, supra note 147, at art. 18. 
158 Id.  
159 Id.  
160 Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze (上市公司治理准则) [Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies] (promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm., 
Sept. 30, 2018, effective Sept. 30, 2018) ST. COUNCIL GAZ. Sept. 30, 2018, art. 
81, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2019/content_5363087.htm 
[https://perma.cc/HT47-J5GW] (China). 
161 Id. at art. 83. 
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voices and interests, both individually and collectively, to establish 
interactive, collaborative, and mutually engaged relationships with 
employees, with these engagements focusing on goals beyond 
corporate self-interest.  According to the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies, “[a] company shall encourage 
employees’ feedback regarding . . . important decisions affecting 
employee’s benefits through direct communications with the board 
of directors, the supervisory board and the management 
personnel.”162 
The Corporate Governance Code in China is “soft law” 
established by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. 163  
These soft law approaches have “potential benefits in dealing with 
costs, contingencies and complementarities”164 and these benefits are 
key for addressing social and environmental challenges as they are 
always resistant to conventional approaches and uncertain.  Soft law 
does allow a role for individual autonomy and circumstances in 
shaping an appropriate compliance response, and its inherent 
flexibility facilitates companies in buying into the “spirit” of the code 
as well as the letter.165  However, the approach has also received 
criticism for the lack of an independent judiciary with enforcement 
powers and the inability to mandate uniform minimum standards.166  
The approach is seen as a window-dressing exercise, “less definitive 
and does not create enforceable rights and duties.”167  In other word, 
“soft law is voluntary” and “lacks mutually agreed upon 
 
162 Id. at art. 85. 
163 Junhai Liu, Globlaisaiton of Corporate Governance Depends on Both Soft Law 
and Hard Law, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND CRITICAL ANALYSES 275, 285 (Jean J. du 
Plessis & Chee Keong Low eds., 2017). 
164 Ruth V. Aguilera, Igor Filatotchev, Howard Gospel & Gregory Jackson, An 
Organizational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: Costs, 
Contingencies, and Complementarities, 19 ORG. SCI. 475, 488 (2008).  
165 ZHAO, supra note 113, at 125–27. 
166 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance’ 54 INT’L ORG., 421–22 (2000).  For examples of the soft law approach, 
see OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011 ed.); INTL’ 
ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 26000 (2010); and The Companies Act, No.18, 
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167 Eugene K. B. Tan, Corporate Social Responsibility as Corporate Soft Law: 
Mainstreaming Ethical and Responsible Conduct in Corporate Governance, 31 
SING. L. REV. 227, 236 (2013). 
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obligations.”168  Furthermore, Chandler sees voluntary approaches to 
address these sustainability challenges as a curse, distracting attention 
from the necessity for effective external control, as “governments 
failed to respond adequately to the implications of a globally 
economy and to demand accountability from company.” 169   An 
approach with voluntary characteristics may not be able to keep pace 
with the intensity and broad range of sustainability challenges, as well 
as the strong push not only from social expectations but also from 
external forces such as global best practices standards and the need 
for global public goods.  These best practice standards come from 
various sources.  With a focus on employees’ interests and human 
rights-related issues, SA8000:2014170 is a set of auditable corporate 
social accountability standards established in 1997 by the Council of 
Economic Priorities Accreditation Association.  It is currently 
supervised by Social Accountability International.  SA8000:2014 is 
designed to “provide an auditable, voluntary standard, based on the 
UN Declaration of Human Rights, ILO and other international human 
rights and labour norms and national labour laws.”171  The system 
requires ongoing compliance and continual improvement of ethical 
standards of corporations, with involvement from stakeholders 
including participation by all key sectors in the SA8000 system, such 
as employees, trade unions, companies, socially responsible investors, 
nongovernmental organizations, the government and the public.172  
The system also introduces nine social accountability requirements 
such as child labour and forced or compulsory labour.173  Therefore, 
a hybrid regulatory framework involving both soft law and hard law 
will “promote the alignment of internal business goals with externally 
set societal goals.” 174   Combination of mandatory and voluntary 
 
168  ABRAHAM L. NEWMAN, ELLIOT POSNER VOLUNTARY DISRUPTIONS: 
INTERNATIONAL SOFT LAW, FINANCE, AND POWER 22 (2018). 
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[https://perma.cc/KGD8-7U8R] (last visited Sept. 9, 2020). 
171 See SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INTERNATIONAL, SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
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173 See SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INTERNATIONAL (SAI), supra note 171. 
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mechanisms will provide the most appropriate solution, where each 
complements the other.175 
CONCLUSION  
The new economy has finally arrived in the twenty-first 
century after being heralded for a long time.  The new economy 
focuses on talent, knowledge and information, and is based on mobile 
devices such as email, the Internet and intranets.  It is characterized 
by a greater stability of GDP and prices, together with a potential drop 
in unemployment and inflation.  In the new economic era, companies 
benefit from the impact of technological innovation on creating long-
term wealth.  Compared to the old economy, information technology 
plays a massive role, and successful companies are always those who 
are the first to obtain sensitive information.   
In the new economy, successful companies always engage 
with various stakeholders not only inside the company, but also 
outside—for goods and services, finance, labor and political 
patronage.  Good relationships with employees, consumers, local 
communities and the media are significant in promoting the 
competence and reputation of a company.  The performance of its 
employees in terms of technological innovation has and will continue 
to accelerate the development of the company, especially in the field 
of advanced technologies.  It is evident that human capital plays a 
crucial role and contributes significantly to the productivity growth 
in the new economy.  Therefore, rather than being regarded as an 
expense of companies, employees should be regarded as an 
investment. 
In terms of the classic corporate objective debate, employees 
are classified as primary and internal stakeholders.  Jurisdictions 
following a stakeholder approach requires the interests of employees 
to be considered and protected by corporate directors.  Hence, it is 
argued that the stakeholder approach, if effectively implemented, is 
an efficient way of protecting the interests of employees in the new 
economic era. 
The interests of employees are always in conflict with those 
of shareholders and other stakeholders, and how to protect their 
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Regulation?, 55 INT’L J. L. & MGMT 173, 177 (2013). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
2020] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 419 
 
interests under company law is an important question.  After 
discussing directors’ duties towards their employees, we find, under 
the ESV model in the UK as well as under Chinese company law and 
corporate governance codes, that the legal mechanisms are difficult 
to enforce, regardless of their educational and guiding functions that 
can help directors think more about operating in the long term and 
change their behaviors when making decisions in relation to 
employees’ interests.  Although directors have been offered 
legitimacy to consider employees’ interests, employees do not 
possess practical abilities to claim remedies if the directors’ decisions 
injure their interests.  Even though there are exceptions, the chances 
of success in a challenge of this kind are extremely slim.  
Further research on the enforcement of directors’ duties 
towards employees under company law—–in jurisdictions other than 
the UK and China will be beneficial, both academically and 
practically.  From an analysis of the CSR ratings for 23,000 
companies from 114 countries, Liang and Renneboog claimed that 
the CSR ratings and a country’s legal origin are closely and strongly 
correlated.176  Comparing the business case of CSR and other factors 
such as ownership, political institutions, and globalisation, legal 
origin is argued as a strong explanation for CSR rating, with 
Scandinavian civil law firms ranking the highest.177  Since this CSR 
rating has a strong relationship with legal protection offered to 
employees, we think it is worthwhile to investigate the legislative 
experiences in jurisdictions such as Finland, Denmark, Gemmary or 
Japan, which may open up new possibilities for transportation.  
Moreover, as the performance of the new economy is aligned with 
the pillars of sustainability including economic, environment, and 
social pillars,178 it is also crucial to study the relationship between the 
advantages of the stakeholder approach and the new economy in the 
narrow and broad perspective.  The study will broaden the horizon of 
stakeholder protection in the new economy era beyond interests of 
employees.  The research findings will support policy makers to 
design legislative approaches to address the sustainability challenges 
as a result of irresponsible corporate conducts and mitigate risks of 
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stakeholder misalignment by developing effective approaches to 
tackle challenges with respect new economy. 
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